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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Access 5 Project seeks to make unmanned flight in the National Airspace System (NAS) as 
routine as manned aircraft flight.  To make this vision a reality there are several hurdles to 
overcome in the areas of technology, procedures, and policy.  The Access 5 partners have 
organized to explore the requirements in each of these areas; one focus is in the area of collision 
avoidance.  Significant reliance on technology will be required to provide a level of flight safety 
that is equivalent to manned flight.  This document details the flow of collision avoidance 
requirements from the operational objectives down to the lower-level functional requirements for 
high altitude, long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). 
 
As a brief overview, the primary operational requirement of Access 5 is:  “The HALE UAS shall 
operate routinely and safely in the NAS.”  Functional decomposition reduces this to the 
following four functions:  Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, and Avoid Hazards.  The Collision 
Avoidance (CA) task is completely contained within the “Avoid Hazards” function.  This 
document exists to detail and justify the requirement flowdown process. 
 
The functional requirements that define CA were initially derived from the six primary “sense 
and avoid” functions, as explored in the Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) document.  They 
were then expanded to seven, as follows: 
• Detect Traffic 
• Track Traffic 
• Evaluate Collision Potential 
• Prioritize Collision Threats 
• Determine Avoidance Maneuver 
• Command Maneuver 
• Execute Maneuver 
 
The logical flow of these functions can be depicted graphically, and such a Functional Flow 
Block Diagram is presented in section 3.4.  There, one can see the points in the chronology of a 
potential cooperative air traffic encounter where the avoidance logic is called upon, and various 
exits from the flow when the situation is deemed “clear of traffic”.  This representation of the CA 
process is helpful in visualizing a typical in-flight scenario. 
 
The document concludes with three appendices that provide additional detail on the requirements 
supporting the overall CA function.  Appendix A decomposes the high level functional 
requirements into more specific performance guidelines.  Appendix B suggests a methodology 
for verifying these requirements.  Appendix C explores some interesting trade-offs to consider 
when establishing requirement values. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Document Organization 
This document is organized into the following sections and appendices: 
 
• Section 1 – Introduction.  States the background, purpose, and scope of this requirements 
document and its role in the Access 5 program.  Also listed are the key assumptions. 
 
• Section 2 – Applicable Documents.  Identifies government and regulatory publications 
cited and referenced when defining the functional requirements and performance 
guidelines. 
 
• Section 3 – Requirements.  Specifies the functional requirements of the Step 1 CA 
subsystem and traces the requirements back to the unmanned aircraft systems high-level 
functional requirements. 
 
• Section 4 – Definitions and Acronyms.  A glossary of terms utilized throughout the 
document. 
 
• Appendix A – Performance, Safety and Quality Guidelines.  Provides a significant 
number of lower level requirements, or “guidelines”, which would support a UAS 
manufacturer during the design process.  Many of them include rationale and discussion 
that is based upon previous research and trade studies.  The intent is to expand upon the 
basic seven CA functions, but not to mandate any particular values for a final product.   
 
• Appendix B – Detailed Verification Matrix.  Contains a verification matrix indicating 
how a typical UAS program might demonstrate that all of its requirements have been 
met.  This tool will also be useful to the Access 5 CA work package in determining what 
simulations to develop. 
 
• Appendix C – Functional Requirements Trade-off Analysis.  Computational investigation 
of sample aircraft capabilities and their trade-offs. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
Due to the ever increasing density of today’s air traffic, traditional “see and avoid” measures 
used by pilots are often supplemented by “sense and avoid” technologies.  The most recent 
developments are cooperative transponder-based systems that interoperate to provide collision 
avoidance guidance or to promote enhanced situational awareness for pilots.  These cooperative 
technologies include Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Traffic Information 
Service-Broadcast (TIS-B), and the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
system.  In addition, the FAA provides an air traffic separation service to all aircraft operating in 
Class A airspace or on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.  These technologies and 
services have been credited with reducing the total number of midair collisions.  As unmanned 
flight becomes increasingly reliable and useful, it may be necessary to adapt these collision 
avoidance technologies initially to remotely piloted vehicles, and eventually to aircraft featuring 
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higher levels of autonomy.  The first step in this process is development of the functional 
requirements that will govern this gradual transformation to the next generation of flight. 
 
The intent of this paper is to establish the collision avoidance (CA) functional requirements for 
high altitude, long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft system (UAS) flight.  Additionally, this 
document identifies the recommended performance and safety guidelines that should be 
considered when establishing future policies, procedures, and standards pertaining to cooperative 
collision avoidance. 
 
1.3 Background 
Access 5 is a national program sponsored by NASA, with participation by aerospace industry 
members, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Department of Defense (DoD).  
Headquarters for this effort is the NASA Access 5 Project Office, located at NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center in Edwards, CA.  The goal is to enable civil HALE UAS to routinely 
operate in the National Airspace System (NAS) as safely as manned aircraft.  Further objectives 
of Access 5 include assisting in the development of UAS policies and procedures, demonstrating 
that all requirements are reasonable and achievable, and identifying infrastructure to promote a 
robust civil market for HALE UAS. 
 
Access 5 plans call for integrating HALE UAS into the NAS through a four-step process:  
1. Routine operations of HALE UA at or above Flight Level (FL) 430 (43,000 feet) with 
take-offs and landings in pre-coordinated/restricted airspace. 
2. Routine operations above FL180 (18,000 feet) with take-offs and landings in pre-
coordinated or special use airspace. 
3. Routine operations above FL180 and access to UAS-designated airports with emergency 
landings in restricted areas. 
4. Routine operations above FL180 and access to UAS-designated airports, including 
emergency landings (i.e., true "file-and-fly"). 
 
Access 5 commenced in May 2004 and is slated to run for five or more years. 
 
1.4 Scope 
The scope of this document is limited to Step 1 of Access 5 and therefore will only address a 
limited range of UAS performance parameters.  However, the functional requirements for 
collision avoidance will continue to be applicable to later steps in the program.  The following 
constraints were used in developing the requirements and guidelines in this paper: 
 
• The requirements apply to HALE UAS.  These systems are defined by having an air vehicle 
element capable of performing mission objectives at FL430 or higher, and with sufficient 
cruise capability to transit the NAS. 
•  This document applies only to Step 1, which is concerned with avoiding cooperative traffic 
only.  Cooperative traffic consists of those aircraft possessing an onboard transponder or 
other system which provides positioning information in 3-D space to air traffic control 
(ATC) and other aircraft.  Non-cooperative aircraft, on the other hand, are not equipped with 
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such systems and therefore may require additional collision avoidance capabilities to achieve 
an acceptable level of safety. 
• These requirements only address the mid-air collision case.  The surface collision case is part 
of future study efforts. 
• Finally, the functional requirements established in this document are to be considered 
minimum requirements to achieve a CA capability.  Further detailed performance guidelines 
will promote a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft avoiding cooperative traffic. 
 
1.5 Assumptions 
The requirements for Step 1 established in this document are based on the following set of 
assumptions: 
 
1. There will be a requirement for 100% usage of cooperative technology.  This is in 
accordance with ATC regulations for Class A airspace. 
2. There will be positive air traffic control. 
3. The UAS will perform no autonomous collision avoidance maneuvers. 
4. The human pilot is a part of the UAS – most likely in the control station element. 
5. The UAS will fly with an IFR clearance. 
6. Collision avoidance activities begin when ATC-mandated separation breaks down.  
 
As depicted in the Figure 1 “onion diagram”, the avoidance of traffic does not begin with the CA 
technologies of the UAS.  Rather, it is accomplished using an integrated, multi-layered approach.  
This begins with aviation procedures and regulations that minimize traffic conflicts – for 
example, aircraft on an IFR flight plan flying a magnetic course of 0o through 179o fly at 
odd multiples of one thousand feet, while the remaining aircraft fly at even altitudes.  The second 
layer is comprised of air traffic management systems such as ATC, which then perform de-
confliction tasks to further reduce potential collision scenarios.  Together, these two outer layers 
seek to ‘avoid conflicts.’  When they fail to provide adequate separation, the collision avoidance 
capabilities of each aircraft are called upon to avoid a mid-air collision.  This final safeguard is 
the “sense and avoid” capability of the aircraft.  Unmanned flight can only be a routine part of 
the NAS when the CA system used by a UAS provides an equivalent level of safety to manned 
flight.  This document addresses the functional requirements for collision avoidance in a 
cooperative environment. 
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2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
Listed below are documents used to develop the CA subsystem requirements.  These may be 
referenced within this document to validate how a specific requirement was developed.   
 
2.1 Government Documents 
2.1.1 FAA Regulations 
• 14CFR 21.21B, “Airworthiness Requirements” 
• 14CFR 91.1, “General Operating and Flight Rules–Applicability”  
o 14CFR 91.111, “Operating Near Other Aircraft ” 
o 14CFR 91.113, “Right of Way Rules: Except Water Operations”  
o 14CFR 91.123, “General Operating and Flight Rules–Compliance with ATC 
Clearances and Instructions” 
o 14CFR 91.155, “Basic VFR Weather Minimums” 
o 14CFR 91.179, “IFR Cruising Altitude or Flight Level” 
o 14CFR 91.215, “ATC transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use” 
 
2.1.2 FAA Orders 
• FAA Order 7110.65P, “Air Traffic Control”, 19 Feb 2004 
• FAA Order 7610.4K, “Special Military Operations”, 19 Feb 2004 
• FAA Order 8020.11, “Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and 
Reporting” 
• FAA Order 8110.4, paragraphs 2-10, “ELOS Findings” 
• FAA Order 8700.1, Ch. 169.  “Investigate a Near Mid-Air Collision” 
 
2.1.3 Other FAA Documents 
• National Airspace System Systems Engineering Manual, version 2.1, 13 Nov 2003 
• National Airspace System Systems Requirements Specification, NAS-SR-1000, Change 10, 
27 Nov 1991 
• FAA System Safety Handbook: Practices and Guidelines for Conducting System Safety 
Engineering and Management, 30 Dec 2000 
• FAA-P-8740-51, FAA Accident Prevention Program, “How to Avoid a Mid Air Collision” 
• AC 90-48C Advisory Circular, “Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance” 
• AC 20-151 Advisory Circular, “Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) Version 7.0 and Associated Mode S Transponders” 
• TSO-C119b “Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment” 
• TSO-C112 “Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/MODE S) 
Airborne Equipment” 
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• TSO-C166 “Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and 
Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio 
Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz)” 
• Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Section 2, paragraph 4-2-1 “General” 
 
2.1.4 Other Government Documents 
• ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air, “Right of Way Rules”. International Civil Aviation 
Organization, Ninth Edition, July 1990 
 
2.2 Non-Government Documents 
2.2.1 Industry Standards 
• RTCA-DO-289,  “Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Aircraft 
Surveillance Applications” 
• RTCA-DO-185A, “Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for TCAS II 
Airborne Equipment” 
 
2.2.2 Industry Documents 
• AOPA Air Safety Foundation, “2003 Nall Report”, 2004 edition   
• NASA Access 5 Project, “HALE ROA Concept of Operations, Ver2”, March 2005 
• NASA Access 5 Project, “Functional Requirements Document, Rev2”, September 2005. 
• NASA Access 5 Project, “Defining the Phrase:  ‘Equivalent Level of Safety, Comparable to 
See-and-Avoid Requirements for Manned Aircraft’,” 27 Sep 2004 
 
 
2.3 Order of Precedence 
When conflicting requirements and guidance are present, government regulations will take 
precedence.   
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3.0 REQUIREMENTS 
A complete listing of the operational and functional requirements for UAS operations is located 
in the Access 5 Step 1 Functional Requirements Document (FRD)1. 
 
3.1 Access 5 Operational Requirements 
According to the Access 5 Concept of Operations (CONOPS)2, the overall goal of the program is 
for HALE UAS to operate routinely and safely within the National Airspace System (NAS).  The 
CA function will support this operational requirement via the high level functional requirement 
“Avoid Hazards” (section 3.2.4).  Access 5 Operational Requirement O1.3 is “The UAS shall 
meet an equivalent level of safety to that of a manned general aviation aircraft.”  Operational 
Requirement O2.1 is “UAS operations shall comply with all applicable 14CFR Part 91 
requirements.”  The CA function supports both of these by fulfilling, in particular, the 
requirement for sense and avoid in 14 CFR Part 91.113, “Right of Way Rules: Except Water 
Operations.”  
 
3.2 UAS Functional Requirements 
The Access 5 Systems Engineering and Integration Team (SEIT) performed a functional analysis 
on an unmanned aircraft system.  One of the resulting products was a hierarchical structure of the 
major functions that comprise any UAS.  In accordance with the NAS Systems Engineering 
Manual3, these functions together should describe what the UAS must be capable of doing in 
order to produce the desired behavior described by the operational requirements.  Figure 2 
depicts these high level functions, which together support the HALE UAS operational 
requirements.  The SEIT identified four high level functions which together enable the UAS to 
perform everything needed to operate routinely and safely in the NAS.  These functions are: (1) 
Aviate, (2) Navigate, (3) Communicate, and (4) Avoid Hazards.  While each of these functions 
are defined later in this section, further details regarding these functions as well as their lower 
level functional breakouts can be found in the Access 5 Step 1 Functional Requirements 
Document and in requirements documents specific to the various work packages. 
 
Figure 2: UAS High Level Functions 
 
 
                                                
1 NASA Access 5 Project, “Functional Requirements Document, Rev 2”, September 2005. 
2 NASA Access 5 Project, “HALE ROA Concept of Operations, Ver2”, March 2005. 
3 Federal Aviation Administration “NAS Systems Engineering Manual, Ver3.0”, 30 September 2004, pg. 4.3-22. 
Operate HALE UAS 
within the NAS 
UAS-F1 
Aviate 
UAS-F2 
Navigate 
UAS-F3 
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UAS-F4 
Avoid 
Hazards 
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3.2.1 UAS-F1: Aviate 
The UAS shall be able to aviate within the NAS.  Aviating includes both controlling and 
monitoring the aircraft and all of its systems necessary for taxi, takeoff, climb, maneuver, cruise, 
approach, descent, and landing or recovery.   
 
3.2.2 UAS-F2: Navigate 
The UAS shall be capable of maintaining navigational control while operating in the NAS.  
Three essential elements to navigation include maintaining knowledge of the current position, 
the destination, and how to get to the destination.  Navigation can be accomplished both 
strategically and tactically.  While a traditional flight plan requires more time to complete and 
would be considered strategic, in-flight maneuvering would be considered a form of tactical 
navigation.   
 
3.2.3 UAS-F3: Communicate 
The UAS shall be able to exchange information (data or voice) with all entities needed to 
maintain safe and reliable UAS operations.  These entities could be both internal and external to 
the UAS.  External interfaces would typically include ATC and other aircraft, while internal 
interfaces might include control stations and ground support. 
 
3.2.4 UAS-F4: Avoid Hazards 
The UA shall avoid hazards while operating in the NAS.  These hazards include terrain, 
hazardous weather, and other traffic – both airborne and on the ground.  “Terrain” includes 
natural features as well as man-made structures, while ground traffic includes other aircraft, 
vehicle, and human traffic.  “Hazardous weather” typically would include thunderstorms and 
icing conditions.  However, this may vary based on the structural characteristics of the UA being 
flown.  The CA function directly supports UAS-F4. 
 
 
3.3 CA Functional Requirements 
Cooperative collision avoidance provides the capability to meet the Step 1 requirement to avoid 
traffic hazards in the NAS.  Should the guidance provided by ATC fail to avoid a conflict, the 
remaining methods of achieving safety are the following: 
 
• The other aircraft maneuvers to avoid collision.  This can only happen if that aircraft has 
a means to detect the UA and still allow sufficient time to maneuver.  Avoidance can also 
be aided if the UA (own ship) is easily detectable – having an active transponder, lights, 
or bright paint, for example. 
• The UA maneuvers to avoid collision.  This requires active sensors, communications with 
other aircraft, and/or CA technology. 
 
In some cases, both of these methods will be employed simultaneously.  Ideally, both aircraft 
would perform a coordinated maneuver that leads to successful avoidance.  However, in order to 
achieve an equivalent level of safety to manned aircraft, one can not assume that ATC guidance 
is infallible, or that the other aircraft will maneuver.  Thus, the CA functional requirements must 
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ensure that a successful own ship avoidance maneuver can be reliably achieved, and is 
acceptable for the environment in which the UA is flying. 
 
A functional break-out of the higher level “Avoid Hazards” function (UAS-F4) is shown in 
Figure 3.  All of the CA Functional Requirements found within this document can be traced back 
directly to this high level UAS function through the lower level function to “Avoid Other 
Traffic” (UAS-F4.1) within the UAS functional hierarchy.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Lower-Level Break-out of the Avoid Hazards Function (UAS-F4) 
 
The following sections comprise what should be considered the minimum threshold set of 
functional requirements needed by a UAS to avoid collisions with other aircraft.   
 
3.3.1 CA F1:  Detect Traffic 
The Collision Avoidance System shall detect traffic within its surveillance volume.   
 
Note 1: The “surveillance volume” is defined by three performance characteristics of the Collision 
Avoidance System:  detection range, azimuth field of regard, and elevation field of regard. 
 
Note 2: For Step 1, this refers only to cooperative traffic, which is defined as other aircraft that broadcast 
positional information using an altitude-encoding transponder. 
 
Note 3: If this function includes conveying data to the UAS pilot, then there must be a human-system 
interface in place to accomplish this task.  
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3.3.2 CA F2:  Track Traffic 
The Collision Avoidance System shall track the detected traffic. 
 
Note 1:  A “track” is established when a state estimate is developed with sufficient confidence.  This 
estimate includes the traffic element’s position and velocity vector. 
 
Note 2: If the UAS pilot is to perform any part of this function, then the relevant detected traffic data must 
be conveyed to the pilot. 
 
3.3.3 CA F3: Evaluate Collision Potential 
The Collision Avoidance System shall evaluate the potential for collision with each traffic 
element being tracked, including the assessment of existing collision threats. 
 
Note: If the UAS pilot is to perform any part (or all) of this function, then the tracked traffic data must be 
conveyed to the pilot. 
 
3.3.4 CA F4: Prioritize Collision Threats 
The Collision Avoidance System shall prioritize the traffic posing a collision threat. 
 
Note 1:  Traffic elements that have been deemed collision threats will be ranked based on time to 
collision, or other similar criteria. 
 
Note 2: If the UAS pilot is to perform any part (or all) of this function, then the collision evaluation data 
must be conveyed to the pilot. 
 
3.3.5 CA F5: Determine Avoidance Maneuver 
The Collision Avoidance System shall determine an avoidance maneuver that prevents a 
collision. 
 
Note 1: The role of the human pilot in CA F5 may vary depending on policy or design decisions:  
A) The pilot may determine the maneuver without assistance from any collision avoidance logic.   
B) The pilot may take into consideration the information provided by collision avoidance logic to help 
make a determination. 
C) The pilot may rely solely upon the maneuver determined by the collision avoidance logic.   
D) The pilot may have no interaction with the maneuver decision whatsoever.  In Access 5, Step 1, option 
D is removed from consideration since autonomous maneuvers have been assumed to be out of scope. 
 
Note 2: If the UAS pilot is to perform any part (or all) of this function, then the prioritized collision threat 
data must be conveyed to the pilot. 
 
3.3.6 CA F6: Command Maneuver 
The Collision Avoidance System shall command an appropriate avoidance maneuver.  
 
Note 1:  The commanded maneuver can include initiating a new maneuver, continuing an ongoing 
maneuver, or terminating an avoidance maneuver if a collision threat no longer exists. 
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Note 2:  In Step 1 it is assumed that the human pilot is part of the CA system and will initiate the 
maneuver, since autonomous maneuvers have been assumed to be outside the scope of Step 1. 
 
3.3.7 CA F7: Execute Maneuver 
The Collision Avoidance System shall perform the commanded maneuver. 
 
Note 1:  This CA functional requirement is essentially performed by the maneuver element of the top level 
“Aviate” function. 
 
Note 2:  The UAS may need to communicate the performance of a maneuver to ATC, per the stipulation in 
14CFR 91.113. 
 
 
3.4 Functional Requirements Flow 
The seven collision avoidance functions that comprise the Avoid Other Traffic function (UAS-
F4.1) are most easily visualized and understood in the context of a Functional Flow Block 
Diagram (FFBD).  This system engineering tool indicates the sequential relationship of a 
system’s functions, the flow of information between functions, decision points, and iterative 
loops.  Figure 4 is an excerpt from a high level FFBD and depicts the continuous nature of the 
‘Avoid Collisions With Other Traffic’ function during flight.  It would normally be part of a 
larger diagram that includes all other functions at the same level (e.g Avoid Hazardous Weather, 
Avoid Collisions With Surface.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Avoid Other Traffic FFBD segment 
 
To gain insight into this “black box”, one decomposes the block to the next level, as shown in 
Figure 5.  The points marked “A” and “B” in Figure 4 are now the beginning and end of the F1-
F7 functional flow that performs UAS collision avoidance.  The following paragraphs will detail 
this flow, and clarify the various logic gates that control it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While airborne 
A B Avoid Collisions  
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  UAS-F4.1 
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CA F1:  Detect Traffic 
Detection of cooperative traffic elements is the function that drives the entire CA process.  The 
rate at which the entire flow repeats is the update rate of the transponder or other sensing device 
used by the UAS.  If no traffic is detected, then the flow for that instance is complete and no 
further functions are performed.  This is shown in Figure 5 by the loop back to the beginning 
(point “A”.)  If there are detections, the flow continues onward to process the traffic information. 
 
CA F2:  Track Traffic 
The Track Traffic function requires information obtained during earlier iterations to determine if 
the detection in this time step can be correlated to data previously collected.  The function, 
therefore, represents more than using the detection data just received; it includes processing the 
new detection(s) with data previously obtained.  This information is used to establish a track 
history for each detected traffic element. 
 
CA F3:  Evaluate Collision Potential 
This function determines the likelihood of collision with each traffic element being tracked.  
Notionally, the function projects the track forward to determine its closest point of approach, and 
then compares that to pre-set avoidance thresholds.  If one or more tracks exceed the threshold 
and pose a threat to the UA, then these evaluations are passed to the next function for 
prioritization.  If no threat exists, then there is no need for the process flow to continue and it 
branches to the end of the loop (point “B” in Figure 5.)  This function also serves to evaluate 
whether an ongoing own ship avoidance maneuver is successfully decreasing the collision risk.  
If the maneuver has succeeded in removing the risk, then the flow branches to F6 where 
“terminate maneuver” is then commanded. 
 
CA F4:  Prioritize Collision Threats 
All traffic elements that are projected to pose a collision threat are prioritized in this function.  
The most likely sort parameter is “time to collision”, or the number of seconds remaining before 
a threat is projected to breach the collision threshold of the UA, as defined in F3. 
 
CA F5:  Determine an Avoidance Maneuver 
This function utilizes collision avoidance logic to recommend an avoidance maneuver that will 
prevent a collision from occurring.  While the logic will focus on the primary threat identified in 
F4, it will also consider how each possible maneuver will affect collision potential with any other 
tracked elements.  During the course of an ongoing maneuver, this function may refine (or 
possibly reverse) the current advisory, based on the output of the preceding functions. 
 
CA F6:  Command Maneuver 
In Step 1, the UAS pilot is responsible for inputting the maneuver command.  He/she will have 
received a maneuver advisory from the preceding function, and there may be data displays from 
which the pilot might gain some situational awareness to additionally inform the decision. 
 
CA F7:  Execute Maneuver 
The command that is input in F6 is relayed to the UA.  At this point, the top level “Aviate” 
function becomes responsible for initiating or maintaining the commanded maneuver.  This 
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function completes the sequential flow depicted in the FFBD, which then starts once again with 
the next sensor update (point “A” in Figure 5.) 
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4.0 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
4.1 Definitions 
 
Advisory – A message given to alert the crew of converging aircraft and/or a potential collision. 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) – A service operated by an appropriate authority to promote the safe, 
orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic. 
Alert – Indication (aural or visual) that provides information to the flight crew in a timely manner 
about a converging aircraft or a potential collision. 
Closest Point of Approach – The minimum distance separating two air vehicles as they encounter 
one another. 
Cooperative Traffic – Traffic that broadcasts position or other information, which assists in detecting 
and assessing conflict potential. 
Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) – A determination that UAS operation has the same amount of 
risk (or better) to people and property as routine operation of a traditionally piloted aircraft.  
False Alert – An alert that is generated when no collision potential exists based on the current UA 
flight path. 
Flight Level (FL) – Flight altitudes above 18,000 MSL related to reference datum of 29.92 inches of 
mercury (e.g. FL250 represents a barometric altimeter indication of 25,000 feet). 
High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS – A UAS capable of performing the mission 
objectives at an altitude of 43,000-foot mean sea level or higher.  It will also possess sufficient cruise 
capability to transit the NAS – at least 24 hours in duration.  
Manned Aircraft – Aircraft that are piloted by a human onboard.  
Non-Cooperative Traffic – Traffic that does not broadcast position or other information.  
Nuisance Alert – An alert that is given when an aircraft is in the collision avoidance operational 
envelope and a maneuver by the UA is not necessary to achieve satisfactory aircraft separation.  (This 
terminology is consistent with early TCAS definitions.2) 
Resolution Advisory (RA) – Aural annunciation and display information provided by the collision 
avoidance subsystem to a flight crew, advising that a particular maneuver should, or should not, be 
performed to attain or maintain safe separation distance from an intruder aircraft.   
Sense and Avoid – The ability to sense traffic which may create a conflict, evaluate flight paths, 
determine traffic right-of-way, and maneuver to avoid other traffic.  
Threat – An intruder aircraft that has satisfied the threat detection logic and thus requires an 
avoidance maneuver 
Traffic –  Any air vehicles that might be encountered by the UA. 
UAS – The Unmanned Aircraft System includes the UA, the control station (which includes the 
human pilot), and all associated communications hardware. 
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4.2 Acronym List 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 
BLOS Beyond Line of Sight 
C2                                    Command and Control 
CA Collision Avoidance 
CAS Collision Avoidance System 
CCA                                Cooperative Collision Avoidance 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CONOPS Concept of Operations document 
DoD Department of Defense 
DSA Detect, See, and Avoid 
ELOS Equivalent Level of Safety (see Definitions) 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FFBD Function Flow Block Diagram 
FL Flight Level 
FOR Field of Regard 
FOV Field of View 
FRD Functional Requirements Document 
HALE High Altitude, Long Endurance (see Definitions) 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
LOS Line of Sight 
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NMAC Near Mid-Air Collision 
RA Resolution Advisory (see Definitions) 
SEIT Access 5 Systems Engineering Integration Team 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
UA Unmanned Aircraft 
UAS       Unmanned Aircraft System 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
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APPENDIX A: PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY GUIDELINES 
FOR COOPERATIVE COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
For Step 1 of Access 5, the Collision Avoidance (CA) function shall provide the UAS pilot with 
the ability to operate the vehicle above FL430 without colliding into other cooperative aircraft.  
To successfully accomplish this, the UAS must be able to perform each of the seven functions 
listed below.  All of these are derived from the six “sense-and-avoid” functions that are outlined 
in the Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) document4, which was also developed under the 
Access 5 Project.     
F1 – Detect traffic 
F2 – Track traffic 
F3 – Evaluate collision potential 
F4 – Prioritize collision threats 
F5 – Determine avoidance maneuver 
F6 – Command maneuver 
F7 – Execute maneuver 
 
Each of these is equally important to the overall objective of the CA function.  In the first 
section, each of these functions are re-stated as the functional requirements introduced in section 
3.3, and are then broken down into the “performance guidelines” which support that particular 
function.  In this way, a parent-child relationship is established which will allow for eventual 
verification of all the CA functional requirements.  Following this is a set of additional 
guidelines relating to overall CA system quality.  
 
A.1 Performance Guidelines 
These suggested system performance requirements, or “guidelines” provide clarification and 
quantification of the CA functional requirements that are the focus of this document.  Many of 
the guidelines have a justification section, based on analysis and/or the results of previous CA 
research:  the 2004 Sensor Trade Study5 performed by the CA work package, and the ROA DSA 
requirements study6 performed in 2003 for the ERAST program, a precursor to Access 5. 
 
A.1.1 CA F1:  Detect Traffic 
The Collision Avoidance System (CAS) shall detect traffic within its surveillance volume.   
A.1.1.1 Minimum Detect Time 
The CAS shall detect traffic with sufficient time remaining for successful performance of all 
required collision avoidance functions.   
                                                
4 NASA Access 5, Defining the Phrase: “Equivalent Level of Safety, Comparable to See and Avoid Requirements 
for Manned Aircraft”.  Revision 3, 27 Sep 2004, pg. 13. 
5 CA Sensor Trade Study Report, Work Package 2, 30 Oct 2004 
6 “Non-Cooperative Detect, See & Avoid Requirements for ROA Operations within Civil Airspace”, NASA 
ERAST, 30 September 2003 
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Note: This Minimum Detect Time includes the delays resulting from sensor update rates, track 
establishment, command and control activities, ATC communications, on-board and off-board 
processing, pilot reaction time, and UA platform reaction time. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  Minimum Detect Time (MDT) is the most critical operational measure of 
a CAS, as it determines the amount of time that the UAS has to recognize a potential conflict and 
take action to avoid it.  Estimated times associated with this topic are discussed in the ELOS 
document and conclude that for manned flight, the collision avoidance activities leading up to 
and including maneuver initiation require up to 12.5 seconds in order to consistently avoid mid-
air collisions.  However, this finding was derived using piloted aircraft, so it does not take any 
communication link delays into account.  Further study and demonstration will provide more 
insight into the impact of these delays on MDT. 
 
Two additional sources providing a nominal timeline for human based collision avoidance are: 
Advisory Circular 90-48C7, and the “Mid-Air Collision Avoidance Document”8 from Tyndall 
AFB.  As shown in Figure A.1, 
12.5 seconds is typically required 
for a pilot to detect an intruding 
aircraft, track the intruder 
aircraft’s flight path, determine 
the collision potential with the 
other aircraft, decide upon an 
evasive maneuver, and then 
actually initiate the evasive 
maneuver.  The original source of 
these estimates was never found; 
however, conversations with Air 
Force and FAA personnel pointed 
to a book called Human Factors in 
Aviation9, which alluded to a 
military source, but did not 
actually identify the specific test 
or report.  This source stated: “Estimates of the time required to recognize an approaching 
aircraft and take evasive action range from 5.0 to 12.5 seconds…”  This estimate was for two jet 
aircraft with a closing velocity of 1100 miles per hour.  
 
A third source for MDT values is the FAA document entitled “How to Avoid a Mid-air 
Collision.”10  This document states “It takes a minimum of 10 seconds for a pilot to spot traffic, 
identify it, realize it is a collision threat, react, and have his aircraft respond.” Based upon these 
three sources, the 12.5 second conclusion was the most conservative value for human pilot 
                                                
7 Advisory Circular AC 90-48C “Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance”, FAA, U.S. Dept. of Transportation 
8 “Mid-Air Collision Avoidance Document”, Tyndall Air Force Base, 18 June 2001, www.tyndall.af.mil/maca/ 
maca.htm 
9 Wiener, Earl & Nagel, David, “Human Factors in Aviation”, Academic Press 
10 FAA-P-8740-51, FAA Accident Prevention Program, “How to Avoid a Mid Air Collision” 
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Figure A.1: Sample human pilot collision avoidance timeline 
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reaction times and is recommended for use as a baseline value when demonstrating an equivalent 
level of safety.11 
 
It is important to note that this 12.5 second duration does not include the time necessary for the 
aircraft to actually complete the maneuver initiated by the pilot.  This is dependent upon the 
performance capability of the aircraft, the type of maneuver performed -- climb or dive, heading 
change, or combination thereof -- and the aggressiveness of the maneuver.  Another performance 
guideline (in F7) covers this aspect of the maneuver.  Furthermore, the timeline presented here is 
further broken down into individual time requirements in sections F2-F6.  
A.1.1.2 Detection Range 
The CAS shall detect cooperative traffic at a range of at least TBD nautical miles. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The detection range is the minimum distance at which the UAS must be 
capable of sensing cooperative traffic elements.  This guideline is directly related to A.1.1.1 
Minimum Detect Time.  Essentially, it is the MDT multiplied by the closing velocity of the two 
aircraft.  Figure A.2 shows the UA side of a lateral (banking) maneuver event.  This analysis 
shows that with a bank angle above 12o and airspeed of under 300 knots, a conservative 
separation distance of 500 feet can be achieved in under 5nm. 
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Figure A.2:  Required lateral maneuver distance for various bank angles and airspeeds 
                                                
11 Wolfe, R.  “DSA Requirements for Remotely Operated Aircraft”.  TTCP Meeting, Edwards, CA. October 2002 
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The “surveillance volume” of the UAS is defined by the detection range, azimuth field of regard, 
and elevation field of regard.  The latter two are described in the following sections. 
A.1.1.3 Azimuth Field-of-Regard (FOR) 
The CAS shall detect cooperative traffic within an azimuth FOR of at least +/-110° referenced 
from the flight path of the UA. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The FAA does not require a 
specific azimuth of visibility from the cockpit, but in 
general a pilot needs to see beyond 90o right and left, 
especially to check the airspace prior to a turn.  Also, 
the FAR right-of-way rules require the converging 
aircraft to deviate to the right to avoid head-on 
conflicts, or deviate to the right to pass behind a 
conflicting aircraft approaching from the right.  It is 
also the responsibility of an overtaking aircraft to 
avoid a slower air vehicle.  The “ICAO Right of 
Way Rules (Annex 2)”12 state that an aircraft 
intercepting from an aspect angle within +/-70o 
measured from the tail, must give way to the other 
aircraft.  As shown in Figure A.3, the supplementary 
angle is therefore +/-110o from the nose of the 
aircraft.  The FAA and Air Safety Foundation pilot 
information pamphlet “How to Avoid a Midair 
Collision”13 states that looking +/-60o off the nose 
would catch the vast majority of conflicting aircraft.  Thus, a Field of Regard (FOR) azimuth of 
+/-110o should be sufficient to provide detection equivalent to a manned aircraft, although more 
analysis may be required to fully validate this requirement. 
 
A.1.1.4 Elevation Field-of-Regard 
The CAS shall detect cooperative traffic within an elevation FOR of at least +/-15° referenced 
from the flight path of the UA.   
 
Discussion/rationale: Although the FAR does not 
require a specific elevation of visibility from the 
cockpit, it does require that climbing/diving aircraft 
give way to air vehicles above/below.  The practical 
requirement, however, is vertical visibility relative to 
the aircraft’s climb/dive maneuver capability.  “How to 
Avoid a Midair Collision” states that looking +/-10o in 
elevation (see Figure A.4) would catch “virtually all conflicting aircraft”.  
 
                                                
12 ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air, “Right of Way Rules”. International Civil Aviation Organization, Ninth Edition, 
July 1990 
13 FAA-P-8740-51, FAA Accident Prevention Program, “How to Avoid a Mid Air Collision” 
Figure A.3: Azimuth FOR based on 
ICAO Right of Way Rules 
 
+ 10o
- 10o
Figure A.4:  Elevation FOR 
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Figure A.5 displays typical climb angles and rates for a variety of general aviation (GA), 
commercial, and military aircraft.  From this graph it can be seen that most general aviation 
aircraft (1,000 to 1,500 fpm rate of climb) will in fact be detected if a pilot scans 15o above and 
below the horizon.     
Figure A.5:  Climb angles vs. Climb rates for various types of aircraft 
 
As stated in “How to Avoid a Midair Collision”, a sensor with an elevation FOR of +/-10o will 
detect most aircraft on collision trajectories flying in the opposite direction and approaching 
from within the front two quadrants (+/-90o).  Upon further analysis, however, this generalization 
is not valid for aircraft traveling in the same general direction.  Both head-on and overtaking 
scenarios are depicted in Figure A.6, in which the opposing traffic is approaching within the blue 
FOR angle, α, and the same direction traffic is approaching within the green FOR angle, θ.  The 
table corresponding to this figure provides the results of an example scenario in which the UA is 
operating at 200 knots and the other aircraft is approaching at a range of speeds (100 to 600 
knots).  In this example, two sets of elevation angles were derived; one set for an aircraft rate of 
climb (roc) of 1,500 fpm, and the other set for an extreme climb rate of 6,000 fpm, which 
represents military aircraft.  The results from this analysis are as follows: 
• Frontal Collision Scenario – The worst-case elevation angle for the head-on collision 
scenario is always from a slower moving aircraft.  For this example, 2.8o elevation FOR 
would be required to detect a 100-knot aircraft climbing/descending at 1,500 fpm, whereas 
11.9o would be needed for a 100-knot aircraft climbing/descending at 6,000 fpm – a 
rather unlikely scenario. 
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• Overtaking Collision Scenario – The worst-case elevation angle for any overtaking collision 
scenario is from a conflicting aircraft flying at the same speed, as it will always be directly 
above or below the UA.  The worst case elevation angle for an overtaking scenario is thus 
90o. 
• θmax is always greater than αmax – The maximum overtaking angle (θmax) is always greater 
than the maximum frontal collision angle (αmax) for the same collision scenario. 
 
 
From this analysis and the climb rate discussion related to Figure A.5, it is concluded that an 
elevation FOR of +/-15o is sufficient to detect collision threats. 
A.1.1.5 Detection Probability 
The CAS shall detect cooperative traffic in the surveillance volume at a rate that supports the 
track probability guideline (A.1.2.3.) 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The CA system must reliably detect potentially conflicting traffic 
elements.  The probability of detection reflects the system’s ability to locate traffic within the 
defined surveillance volume with each scan or update made by the system.  Work by the Air 
Force Research Laboratory and DRA in Ohio indicate that a 90% detection rate is comparable to 
a traditional piloted aircraft.14  However, based upon the assumption that a track is established 
after three consecutive positive detections, a probability of 98.3%15 is needed to support the 95% 
track probability suggested in A.1.2.3.  
                                                
14 “See and Avoid for UAVs”, DRA presentation to OSD, Crystal City, VA, 17 July 2001 
15 Note (.983)3 = .95 
Figure A.6:  Example of a frontal and overtaking collision scenario  
with respect to elevation angles 
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A.1.1.6 Detection Rate 
The average CAS detection rate shall be equal to or greater than 1.0 hertz.  
 
Discussion/rationale:  The detection rate is the frequency at which sensor data is gathered.  As 
discussed in section 3.4.1, the other avoidance functions essentially operate at this same 
frequency.  A low update rate may lead to a misdiagnosis of a conflict situation, especially if the 
conflicting traffic is maneuvering.  Using the TCAS performance as a basis for evaluation, 1.0 
Hz (an update every second) is determined to be the minimum acceptable rate.  The actual 
surveillance period is a pseudo-random interval varied uniformly between 0.8 and 1.2 seconds.  
The jitter is required so false tracks will not be established by replies to other TCAS-equipped 
intruder aircraft or ground stations. 
A.1.1.7 Detection Accuracy 
The CAS shall detect cooperative traffic with accuracy in range, altitude, and azimuth 
determinations that is at least equivalent to the TCAS-II system. 
 
Discussion/rationale:   
As TCAS-II is a collision avoidance technology approved by the FAA, this discussion lists the 
sources of error that contribute to its overall performance.  It can be assumed that an acceptable 
final guideline for detection accuracy will be at least as strict as the error bounds presented here. 
 
Altitude error/accuracy.  The table to the right is from DO-
185A16, section 3.2.8.1.  It describes the pressure altitude 
accuracy assumed for both the TCAS-equipped airplane and the 
intruder aircraft (Mode C or Mode S).  The error is assumed to 
be met with a 99.7% (3σ) confidence level. 
 
Range accuracy. DO-185A section 2.2.2.2.3 describes 
accuracy/error in range estimations.  The overall range accuracy 
achievable by TCAS depends on the following error 
contributions to the measurement of reply arrival time: 
 
a) Transponder reply delay and jitter 
b) Apparent reply jitter due to the signal delay difference between the diversity transponder top 
and bottom antenna channel (including the cable and antenna location) 
c) Apparent reply jitter due to transmit and receive delay differences between the TCAS top and 
bottom antenna channel (including the cable and antenna location) 
d)  TCAS range clock quantization 
e)  TCAS system noise 
 
The first two error sources are associated with the transponder and are not under control of the 
TCAS manufacturer.  Nevertheless, for received power levels at least 6 dB above the minimum 
trigger level (MTL) and for transponders meeting the characteristics specified in Mode S MOPS 
(DO-181A) TCAS should be able to achieve an overall range measurement with an error not 
                                                
16 RTCA-DO-185A, “Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for TCAS II Airborne Equipment” 
 
Altitude Error Bound (ft) 
MSL 135 
5k 144 
10k 156 
15k 174 
20k 195 
25k 213 
30k 234 
35k 258 
40k 285 
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exceeding 50 ft RMS jitter for both Mode C and Mode S reports, a 250 ft bias for mode C 
reports, and a 125 ft bias for Mode S reports. 
 
Independent of transponder effects, the TCAS-only range measurement error (considering only 
error sources c, d, and e above) will not exceed 35 ft RMS jitter for either Mode C or Mode S 
reports for received power levels at least 6 dB above MTL.  As a result, the error for Mode S 
operation would be contained within a +/-175 ft band, and +/- 300 ft for Mode C. 
 
Azimuth (bearing) accuracy.  Primary bearing error contributors are the antenna manufacturing 
tolerances, antenna installation rotation and tilt, pattern disturbances due to reflections, antenna 
cable attenuation differences, receiver channel to channel amplitude differences, and TCAS 
system noise. 
 
From DO-185A, section 2.2.4.6.4.2.1, with the standard ground plane (not installed on aircraft), 
the bearing error of the TCAS system shall not exceed 9o RMS or 27o peak for elevation angles 
between –10o and +10o.  From DO-185A, section 2.2.4.6.4.2.2, the bearing error shall not exceed 
15o RMS or 45o peak for elevation angles between +10o and +20o.  These errors account for the 
uninstalled system errors.  The errors associated with installation are to be included separately. 
 
A.1.1.8 False Detection/Nuisance 
False detections shall occur at a rate that supports the false track guideline (A.1.2.6). 
 
Discussion/rationale:  Along with reliably detecting real objects, the system must not 
experience excessive false detections.  The probability of false detection is the rate at which the 
CA system will mistakenly indicate the presence of a “ghost” traffic element.  A Lockheed 
study17 identified some potential causes, including navigation error, communication latency, data 
dropouts, and the validity of relative aircraft geometric information.  Additionally, incorrectly 
received signals, such as those due to multi-path errors, should also be removed from the 
detection function.  Improving the false detection rate by decreasing the Look Ahead Time can 
be traded off against the resulting reduction in decision time for the UAS.  Clearly, an 
autonomous system would require less advance notice than a piloted one, but this is not the case 
in Step 1.  Users should be informed of the inevitable occurrence of false detections when 
enlisting automated CA systems.  A recommended false detection rate is on the order of 1%. 
 
  
A.1.2 CA F2:  Track Traffic 
The Collision Avoidance System shall track the detected traffic. 
 
Note:  A “track” is established when a state estimate is developed with sufficient confidence.  
This estimate includes the traffic element’s position and velocity vector. 
                                                
17 Lockheed Martin , “CCA False Alert/Evasion Study”, Appendix B to CCA FRD Rev 2, 2004.  
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A.1.2.1 Tracking Surveillance Volume 
The CAS shall track cooperative traffic within an azimuth FOR of at least +/-110° and elevation 
FOR of at least +/-15° referenced from the flight path of the UA.   
 
Note:  The third dimension of the surveillance volume shall be defined according to the criteria 
in A.1.1.1 Minimum Detect Time and/or A1.1.2 Detection Range. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  See A.1.1.1 - A1.1.4 for rationale supporting the recommended 
surveillance volume. 
A.1.2.2 Simultaneous Track Capability 
The CAS shall be capable of simultaneously maintaining tracks on at least 35 cooperative 
aircraft in the UA platform’s surveillance volume. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The CA system is required to detect and simultaneously track multiple 
potentially conflicting traffic elements.  The TSO-certified Skywatch traffic advisory system 
tracks up to 35 traffic elements.  Although the system can track that many, only the 8 greatest 
threats are displayed to the user of the system.18  Some sensors may filter data to avoid 
information overload and thereby allow a more succinct situational awareness for the pilot.  
Other sensors have bandwidth limitations.  With aircraft densities being relatively low above 
FL430, the capability to track 35 intruders would be more than sufficient for Step 1 of Access 5. 
A.1.2.3 Track Probability 
The CAS shall establish a unique track on at least 95% of the cooperative traffic within the UA 
platform’s surveillance volume. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The FAA-certified TCAS II system specifies a 95% track probability, so 
it seems reasonable that the same threshold should be met or exceeded by any future CA system 
used in the NAS. 
A.1.2.4 Track Quality 
The CAS shall establish and maintain a track for traffic deemed eligible for collision avoidance 
with a confidence of TBD. 
 
Note:  “Eligible traffic” are those elements that exceed the threshold level of confidence as 
defined in this guideline. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  Confidence encompasses both the integrity of the data and the probability 
of detecting a target.  Each CAS will be certified by end-to-end and component level testing 
before being used in the NAS.   
                                                
18 Federal Air Regulations (FAR), Part 23, Subsection D, “Design and Construction” 
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A.1.2.5 Track Accuracy 
The CAS shall maintain track accuracy that is sufficient to support the requirement to detect 
collision threats, and to not generate nuisance alerts on non-threats. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  Unless a reliable velocity can be obtained by the sensor, it is necessary to 
perform some filtering to smooth noise from measurements.  This will help to satisfy both parts 
of the requirement.  Too great a reliance on noisy measurements would cause delayed or missed 
necessary alerts, and would also lead to nuisance alerts.  For maneuvering targets, the filtering 
must reflect a tradeoff between the smoothing of noise and the timely detection of trajectory 
changes.  Furthermore, the design of a tracker must reflect the characteristics of the sensor used, 
as well as those of the target population (e.g. maneuvering). 
 
A.1.2.6 False Tracks 
False tracks shall account for no more than 1.2% of all tracks established by the CAS. 
 
Note:  A false track occurs when several false detections occur consecutively and trick the CAS 
into forming a “phantom” track. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  Guideline A.1.1.8 provides a list of factors that may contribute to false 
tracks being established.  DO-185A15 section 3.4.4.1 outlines a testing methodology for 
certifying a TCAS-II system receiving Mode C transponder transmissions.  In it, 1.2% is 
provided as the maximum allowable false track rate, which is defined there as the ratio of the 
total number of false track-seconds to the total number of track-seconds associated with real 
aircraft.  When receiving Mode S transponder input, the requirement becomes 0%.  Since Mode 
S is not mandated for UAS, a probability of 1.2% is a reasonable threshold for this guideline. 
A.1.2.7 Time to Establish Track 
The CAS shall establish a track on detected cooperative traffic in the surveillance volume within 
TBD seconds of initial detection. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The Tyndall study referenced in A.1.1.1 found that 1.0 second was 
typical for a pilot to track a potential threat.  Since the UAS requires multiple detections to 
establish a track, and detections can be up to a second apart, it is unlikely that this same timeline 
can be met.  However, a trade-off is possible since the time required to evaluate collision 
potential, prioritize threats, and determine an appropriate maneuver (F3-F5) will be much 
quicker using collision avoidance logic. 
 
 
A.1.3 CA F3: Evaluate Collision Potential 
The Collision Avoidance System shall evaluate the potential for collision with each traffic 
element being tracked, including the assessment of existing collision threats. 
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A.1.3.1 Threat Evaluation 
The CAS shall continuously determine if any detected traffic elements pose a collision threat to 
the UA. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  A “collision threat” can be defined as any traffic element that is projected 
to breach the virtual “hockey puck” surrounding the UA.  The dimensions of this relatively short, 
wide cylinder of airspace, centered on the own ship, are arbitrary and subject to further 
discussion.  This particular shape, however, is a reasonable selection for two reasons:  a) The 
horizontally-oriented wingspan of every air vehicle is much greater than its height.  b) Typical 
flight procedures in Class A airspace rely heavily on level flight, which means that safety can be 
maintained with smaller separations in the vertical direction. 
A.1.3.2 Time to Classify Collision Potential 
The CAS shall determine the potential for collision posed by each tracked traffic element within 
TBD seconds of track establishment. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The Tyndall AFB Midair Collision Avoidance document lists the human 
standard as approximately five seconds to identify the collision potential.19  Based on this 
analysis, the CAS should be able to process the traffic tracking data and determine if an 
imminent conflict must be avoided within the same time limitation, and quite possibly much 
more quickly. 
A.1.3.3 Maneuver Completion 
The CAS shall determine and indicate to the pilot when the collision potential has been removed 
so routine mission activities can be resumed.20 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The Functional Flow Block Diagram in section 3.4 indicates why this 
guideline is a necessary part of F4.  Basically, if the maneuver has removed all threat of collision 
with the tracked traffic elements, the flow branches to F6 where a “terminate maneuver” 
command is issued so that normal operations may resume. 
 
 
A.1.4 CA F4: Prioritize Collision Threats 
The Collision Avoidance System shall prioritize the traffic posing a collision threat. 
A.1.4.1 Multiple Threat Prioritization 
The CAS shall prioritize every traffic element that has been deemed a collision threat. 
 
Note:  “Time-to-collision”, or the calculated time until the threat breaches the UA’s hockey 
puck-shaped airspace (see A.1.3.1),  is the criterion by which prioritization will occur. 
                                                
19 “Mid-Air Collision Avoidance Document”, Tyndall Air Force Base, 18 June 2001 
20 In accordance with SAE ARP4153 paragraph 8.3.3.3 
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A.1.4.2 Time to Prioritize Threats 
The CAS shall prioritize the collision threats within TBD seconds of collision potential 
classification. 
 
 
A.1.5 CA F5: Determine Avoidance Maneuver 
The Collision Avoidance System shall determine an avoidance maneuver that prevents a 
collision. 
A.1.5.1 Recommended Maneuver 
The CAS shall determine a feasible avoidance maneuver that prevents a collision with the most 
immediate threat from occurring. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The avoidance maneuver can include a turn, climb, descent, or 
climb/descent in combination with a turn, constrained by the aeronautical capabilities of the UA.  
An important consideration is for the recommended maneuver to be compatible and coordinated 
with a threat that is simultaneously maneuvering (see A.2.4.3.)  Additionally, the recommended 
avoidance maneuver should comply with the current “right of way” rules21 and be compatible 
with CA systems currently utilized in the NAS.  For example: 
1. If the UA has a TCAS-II and is operated in RA mode, then the UA will be expected to 
perform the same maneuver as a manned aircraft. 
2. If the UA has a TCAS-II in TA only mode, it must not disturb the established TCAS 
protocol. 
 
A corollary requirement that is also valid:  The CAS shall not fail to recommend a collision 
avoidance maneuver in a situation that requires one.  This is known as an “unresolved collision” 
or “unresolved evasion.” 
A.1.5.2 Multiple Collision Threats/Induced Collision 
The rate that the CA subsystem provides maneuver guidance that creates a more hazardous 
situation shall be on the order of 1.0X10-6 per flight hour. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The selection of avoidance maneuver must also take into account any 
other tracked and prioritized traffic elements.  An induced collision occurs when a CAS advisory 
is followed and leads to a collision (or near mid-air collision) when taking no action whatsoever 
would not have led to a collision event.  This requirement leads to an additional, but critical level 
of complexity in the collision avoidance logic.  It is also related to the Unnecessary Evasion 
requirement (A.1.5.3), in that it is an incorrectly advised maneuver.  AC 23.1309-1C22 provides 
guidance regarding catastrophic events such as an induced collision.  Figure 2 in section 9.b.3 
indicates that a Class IV aircraft (commuter category) has an allowable probability of 
catastrophic failure of less than 10-9.  This is relaxed to 10-6 for Class I vehicles (small general 
aviation aircraft.) 
                                                
21 CFR 91.113, “Right of Way Rules: Except Water Operations” 
22 Advisory Circular 23.1309-1C “Equipment, Systems, and Installations in Part 23 Airplanes”, March 1999. 
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A.1.5.3 Unnecessary Evasion 
The probability of an unnecessary evasion maneuver advisory being generated without failure 
annunciation shall be on the order of 1X10-4 per flight hour in the terminal environment and 
1.0X10-5 per flight hour in the en route environment.   
 
Discussion/rationale:  A University of Illinois paper on automated CA devices23 posits the 
following:  “It is not possible to determine a fixed threshold for an ‘acceptable’ false alert rate 
due to the complexity of constructs such as trust and workload … as well as the diversity of the 
operational environments and settings in which alerting systems are used.  The false alert 
tolerance could be increased by improving the ROA pilot’s general awareness of the traffic 
situation.”  In other words, in order to avoid the “cry wolf” phenomenon in which pilots ignore 
or mistrust frequent collision alerts, steps must be taken to ensure that the pilot has the best 
possible data upon which to base maneuver decisions.  The values given are based on current 
commercial collision avoidance systems. 
A.1.5.4 Adjust for Maneuver 
The CAS shall revise the maneuver recommendation when other aircraft are simultaneously 
maneuvering.24 
 
Note:  A maneuver revision may not be necessary, but the CAS should be capable of a mid-
maneuver adjustment, similar to a TCAS reversal advisory. 
A.1.5.5 Time to Determine Maneuver 
The CAS shall notify the UAS pilot of the recommended avoidance maneuver with sufficient 
time remaining to initiate the maneuver and avoid collision. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The Tyndall AFB report estimates the human capability as approximately 
4 seconds to decide on an evasive maneuver.  This is the value that the ELOS document uses in 
its calculation of the expected duration of sense-and-avoid functions. 
 
A.1.6 CA F6: Command Maneuver 
The Collision Avoidance System shall command an appropriate avoidance maneuver. 
A.1.6.1 Pilot Response Time 
The UAS shall command an avoidance maneuver within TBD seconds of a collision avoidance 
maneuver being advised by the CAS.   
 
Note:  The pilot is considered an integral part of the UAS, and in Step 1 will be ultimately 
responsible for commanding an avoidance maneuver. 
 
                                                
23 Thomas, Wickens, Rantanen, Institute of Aviation, Aviation Human Factors Division, UIUC, “Imperfect 
Automation in Aviation Traffic Alerts: A Review of Conflict Detection Algorithms and their Implications for Human 
Factors Research”, 2003. 
24 In accordance with SAE ARP4153 “Human Interface Criteria for Collision Avoidance Systems” 
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Discussion/rationale:  The Tyndall report derived 4.0 seconds from their study for the act of 
making a maneuver decision. 
 
 
A.1.7 CA F7: Execute Maneuver 
The Collision Avoidance System shall perform the commanded maneuver. 
A.1.7.1 Maneuver Initiation Accuracy 
The UA shall precisely execute the maneuver that was commanded. 
A.1.7.2 UA Response Time 
The UA shall initiate the commanded avoidance maneuver within TBD seconds of the pilot 
inputting the command.   
 
Discussion/rationale:  Normally, the aircraft will take approximately a second or two to begin 
responding after the pilot inputs the maneuver decision – this is known as “maneuver onset.”  
This is based entirely on the responsiveness of the aircraft.  In addition, the UAS 
communications link will introduce a slight delay.  The Tyndall report derived 2.4 seconds from 
their study, although more time may be required for a UAS. 
A.1.7.3 UA Response Characteristics 
The UA response characteristics shall be an input to the CAS. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  This requirement deals with the UA flight characteristics.  It is important 
that the UA be able to perform the commanded maneuver in a reasonable amount of time, and 
achieving the desired maneuver state quickly is the initial step.  It is critical that the collision 
avoidance logic be calibrated to the responsiveness and maneuverability of the UA with which it 
is being used. 
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A.2 System Quality Guidelines 
These guidelines govern the overall CA function, and recommend a level of quality that the 
system should meet in order to achieve its goal of avoiding collisions with cooperative aircraft.  
A more detailed explanation of these guidelines and rationale for the suggested values should be 
included in future revisions of this document. 
 
A.2.1 System Continuity 
The CA function shall have continuity similar to that of manned aircraft.   
 
Note:  Continuity addresses the end-to-end system functionality – the ability to be available when 
needed, and to provide continuous capability throughout a designated time frame.  
A.2.1.1 Availability 
The CA system shall have an availability that ensures a sufficient level of safety in the NAS. 
 
Discussion:  This parameter is related to reliability.  The technical definition of availability is 
Operating Time/(Operating Time + Maintenance Down Time).  On manned aircraft, a traffic 
detecting system such as TCAS is generally classified as essential (but not critical) equipment; a 
loss of its availability is defined by SAE ARP476125 as “Minor” on the Failure Condition 
Severity Classification scale.  The associated probability of occurrence for this rating is 1x10-3 
per flight hour, or one occurrence every 1000 hours.  This requirement may be significantly 
stricter for a UA since there is no pilot performing the See & Avoid function. 
A.2.1.2 Reliability 
The CA system shall have a Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 10,000 hours. 
 
Discussion:  The Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) – the average number of hours a 
particular system will operate without a failure – determines the system’s reliability.  For those 
technologies that are still in early stages of development, engineering judgment is used based on 
similar technologies and concepts.  The MTBF for an established system varies with its intended 
usage.  For example, a commercial transport vehicle generally experiences relatively long cycle 
durations (3-10 hours), low vibration, and often has a temperature and humidity-controlled 
environment for its electronic devices.  Thus, a TCAS box might be expected to last 20,000 
hours between failures.  A helicopter, on the other hand, presents much more demanding 
physical circumstances; a MTBF for the same component may be around 5,000 hours.  Since a 
HALE UA is designed for extremely long cycle times (over 24 hours), but is small and 
susceptible to vibration, environment, and potential hard landings, it is expected that a MTBF of 
10,000 hours is a reasonable preliminary estimate. 
A.2.1.3 Operation during Maneuver 
The performance of the CA subsystem shall not be adversely affected by forces generated during 
a maneuver, or the resultant change in UA attitude. 
                                                
25 SAE ARP4761 “Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne 
Systems and Equipment”, December 1996. 
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A.2.2 Operating Environment 
The CA subsystem shall be able to function in all environmental conditions encountered during 
normal operation. 
A.2.2.1 Lighting Conditions 
The CA subsystem operation shall not be adversely affected by ambient lighting conditions, such 
as darkness or sun glint. 
A.2.2.2 Weather Conditions 
The CA subsystem shall be capable of operation in all normal weather conditions encountered, 
such as clouds and precipitation. 
 
Discussion:  The CA subsystem should be capable of detecting traffic in all VFR weather 
conditions at least as well as a human.  However, according to FAR 91.113, the pilot of an 
aircraft is responsible for “see and avoid” whether they are operating under VFR or IFR.26  
Therefore, having the capability to detect other aircraft through various conditions (e.g. rain, fog, 
clouds) is still a requirement for UAS.  This requirement does not take into account the 
environmental effects on the hardware itself, such as temperature and pressure of the 
compartment containing the CA hardware (see A.2.2.3). 
A.2.2.3 Other Environmental Conditions 
The CA subsystem hardware shall be able to withstand the range of interior temperatures, 
atmospheric pressures, humidity, and electromagnetic interference that can be expected during 
normal operation of all UAS elements. 
 
 
A.2.3 System Integrity 
The CA subsystem shall have an integrity value similar to the collision avoidance systems of 
manned aircraft, such as TCAS II.  This is an indication of the system’s ability to identify 
degraded input data or system functionality and continue sense and avoid operations within the 
limitations of the degraded system. 
A.2.3.1 Fault Detection 
The probability that a fault causing unsafe operation or lack of functionality will occur in the CA 
subsystem without notification to the UAS pilot shall be less than TBD. 
A.2.3.2 Fault Tolerance 
The CA subsystem shall fail-operate following a single failure, and fail-safe when unable to 
perform two or more subsystem functions. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  This guideline requires further discussion to ensure that it is not too strict. 
                                                
26 FAR 91.113, “FAA Right of Way Rules”, Federal Aviation Regulations General Operating and Flight Rules 
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A.2.3.3 False Alerts/Alarms 
The CA subsystem false alert/alarm rate shall be less than 2%. 
 
Discussion/rationale:  The NAS System Requirements document specifies a goal of no more 
than 2% nuisance alert rate and a threshold requirement of 6 percent for the air surveillance 
function of the NAS.27 
 
 
A.2.4 System Interoperability 
The UAS shall not cause performance degradation to any other system, external or internal to the 
UAS. 
A.2.4.1 UAS System Impact 
The CA subsystem shall not adversely affect any of the other UAS subsystems’ abilities to 
perform their intended functions.  This includes all components of the Air Vehicle Element, the 
Communications Element, and the Control Element. 
A.2.4.2 NAS Impact 
The CA subsystem shall burden the NAS no more than a typical manned aircraft.  This includes 
interactions with ATC and other aircraft. 
A.2.4.3 Compatibility with Other Aircraft 
The CA subsystem shall be interoperable and suggest maneuvers that are compatible with the 
CA systems used on all aircraft that may be routinely encountered. 
 
Note: This guideline is to ensure that all suggested collision avoidance maneuvers are 
compatible and/or coordinated with the threat. 
A.2.4.4 Detectability 
The UA shall be detectable by other traffic.   
Note: Methods may include, but are not limited to the use of a transponder, high visibility paint, and 
lights. 
 
 
A.2.5 System Certifications 
The UAS shall have the appropriate certifications for its intended operational regime. 
A.2.5.1 Safety Certification 
The CA subsystem shall have a safety criticality certification of TBD, as defined in DO-178B. 
A.2.5.2 Software Certification 
The CA subsystem software shall be certified in accordance with DO-178B Level TBD. 
                                                
27 FAA, NAS-SR-1000, NAS System Requirements, Change 10, Nov 1991.  
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A.2.5.3 Operational Maturity 
The CA subsystem shall be certified to NASA TRL TBD or higher. 
 
Discussion:  This metric describes the level of development and testing that the 
system/technology has demonstrated.  This metric also attempts to incorporate the certification 
of the system.  The NASA Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is used to evaluate the parameter.  
Given the timetable of the Access 5 program, the minimum level to meet CA requirements is 
TRL 6, which corresponds to a technology flight demonstration. 
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APPENDIX B: VERIFICATION MATRIX 
The five methods of requirements verification planned for Access 5 are: 
 
• Inspection/evaluation (I) – Examination of equipment, drawings, or documentation. 
• Analysis (A) – A method that utilizes established technical or mathematical algorithms, 
charts, graphs, circuit diagrams, or other scientific principles and procedures. 
• Simulation/modeling (S) – The process of conducting experiments with a model. 
Simulation may include the use of analog or digital devices, laboratory models, or “testbed” 
sites. 
• Demonstration (D) – A method that generally utilizes, under specific scenarios, the actual 
operation, adjustment, or reconfiguration of items. 
• Test (T) – A method of verification that generally determines, quantitatively, the properties 
or elements of items, including functional operation, and involves the application of 
established scientific principles and procedures. 
 
  Verification Method 
 Title I A S D T 
A.1 Performance Guidelines      
A.1.1 CA F1:  Detect Traffic      
A.1.1.1 Minimum Detect Time   X X  
A.1.1.2 Detection Range   X X  
A.1.1.3 Azimuth Field-of-Regard (FOR)  X  X  
A.1.1.4 Elevation Field-of-Regard  X  X  
A.1.1.5 Detection Probability   X   
A.1.1.6 Detection Rate  X    
A.1.1.7 Detection Accuracy  X    
A.1.1.8 False Detection/Nuisance   X X  
A.1.2 CA F2:  Track Traffic      
A.1.2.1 Tracking Surveillance Volume  X  X  
A.1.2.2 Simultaneous Track Capability   X   
A.1.2.3 Track Probability   X X  
A.1.2.4 Track Quality  X  X  
A.1.2.5 Track Accuracy  X  X  
A.1.2.6 False Tracks   X   
A.1.2.7 Time to Establish Track   X   
A.1.3 CA F3: Evaluate Collision Potential      
A.1.3.1 Threat Evaluation   X   
A.1.3.2 Time to Classify Collision Potential   X   
A.1.3.3 Maneuver Completion   X   
A.1.4 CA F4: Prioritize Collision Threats      
A.1.4.1 Multiple Threat Prioritization  X    
A.1.4.2 Time to Prioritize Threats   X   
A.1.5 CA F5: Determine Avoidance Maneuver      
A.1.5.1 Recommended Maneuver   X   
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A.1.5.2 Multiple Collision Threats/Induced Collision   X   
A.1.5.3 Unnecessary Evasion  X    
A.1.5.4 Adjust for Maneuver   X   
A.1.5.5 Time to Determine Maneuver   X   
A.1.6 CA F6: Command Maneuver      
A.1.6.1 Pilot Response Time   X   
A.1.7 CA F7: Execute Maneuver      
A.1.7.1 Maneuver Initiation Accuracy   X X  
A.1.7.2 UA Response Time   X   
A.1.7.3 UA Response Characteristics  X  X  
       
A.2 System Quality Guidelines      
A.2.1 System Continuity      
A.2.1.1 Availability  X    
A.2.1.2 Reliability  X    
A.2.1.3 Operation during Maneuver  X    
A.2.2 Operating Environment      
A.2.2.1 Lighting Conditions     X 
A.2.2.2 Weather Conditions     X 
A.2.2.3 Other Environmental Conditions     X 
A.2.3 System Integrity      
A.2.3.1 Fault Detection  X  X  
A.2.3.2 Fault Tolerance  X    
A.2.3.3 False Alerts/Alarms  X    
A.2.4 System Interoperability      
A.2.4.1 UAS System Impact  X    
A.2.4.2 NAS Impact  X  X  
A.2.4.3 Compatibility with Other Aircraft X   X  
A.2.4.4 Detectability X     
A.2.5 System Certifications      
A.2.5.1 Safety Certification  X    
A.2.5.2 Software Certification  X    
A.2.5.3 Operational Maturity X     
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APPENDIX C:  FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TRADE-OFF 
ANALYSIS 
 
C.1 Introduction 
The framework for UAS sense and avoid is comprised of six basic functions derived from the 
human model for mid-air collision avoidance.  These steps involve:  1) scanning the surrounding 
airspace for other aircraft, 2) tracking any detected traffic, 3) determining if the detected aircraft 
is on a collision trajectory, 4) deciding what evasive maneuver must be performed, if any, 5) 
initiating the appropriate maneuver and 6) assessing if the maneuver was effective.  Each of 
these functions cannot, however, be evaluated in isolation.  This appendix begins to address 
trade-offs by presenting examples of the analysis required for future platform designs in order to 
make decisions on vehicle maneuverability, sensor capability, and data processing requirements. 
 
C.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this analysis is to supplement the functional requirements that have been 
identified in this document.  Most of the functional requirements have been written to allow the 
UAS designers and manufacturers some flexibility in how they achieve an equivalent level of 
safety and perform the six collision avoidance steps listed above.  However, the following graphs 
and tables attempt to provide a frame of reference for several example collision threat scenarios.  
Hopefully, this will provide some insight into the kind of trade-offs that can be made with certain 
design qualities of a UA.  For example, a highly maneuverable UA will require less distance 
from a conflicting aircraft at the initiation of the avoidance maneuver due to its higher turn rate 
and climb/dive rates.   
 
C.3 Model Description 
The data presented in this appendix was generated with an EXCEL-based encounter model 
developed by Modern Technology Solutions, Incorporated (MTSI) to examine potential collision 
scenarios between two aircraft.  The model uses simplified flight path calculations based on 
aircraft bank angle and velocity to determine the closest point of approach for a given set of 
starting conditions.  In an iterative mode, the model can be used to vary input parameters over a 
desired range to generate a set of curves showing the minimum distance necessary between 
aircraft at the beginning of an avoidance maneuver to achieve a desired miss distance.  The 
avoidance maneuver can be either a climb/dive action or a change in heading. 
 
C.4 Model Assumptions and Inputs 
Each encounter is modeled by establishing the initial conditions for both aircraft, positions 
relative to the potential impact point using aircraft bearing and separation distance, and UA 
maneuver parameters as shown in Figure 1.  For this analysis, the conflicting aircraft was 
assumed to be non-maneuvering.  Given the initial conditions, the model determines the closest 
point of approach by calculating relative positions as the scenario runs until the separation 
distance begins to increase.  At the initiation of the scenario, the UA is assumed to roll 
instantaneously to the bank angle necessary to achieve the required turn rate until reaching the 
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heading change input value.  Similarly, when a climb/dive maneuver is initiated, the desired rate 
is achieved instantaneously and maintained until the altitude change is completed.    
 
When the model is used in the iterative mode, the primary output is a report of the minimum 
distance required between the aircraft at the initiation of the avoidance maneuver to ensure the 
required miss distance is not penetrated.  This mode provided the best method for studying the 
functional requirement trade-offs.  Although this model helped develop better understanding of 
the encounter geometry and critical factors, all data should be considered notional because of the 
simplifying assumptions applied to UA maneuvering. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Model Input Variables 
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Intruder Vertical Velocity 
Intruder Altitude 
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C.5 Minimum maneuver distance/time results 
The results in this section demonstrate trade-offs between UA maneuverability and the minimum 
distance between aircraft for initiation of an avoidance maneuver to maintain the indicated miss 
distance.  Figure 2 can be used for all results to convert from turn rate to UA bank angle. 
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Figure 2:  Platform Maneuverability 
 
C.5.1 Horizontal Maneuver  
Several scenarios were run to gain a better understanding of the impact of UA and intruder 
velocity on the Minimum Maneuver Distance (distance between aircraft at the initiation of the 
avoidance maneuver) required to maintain a series of required miss distances (100-1000 ft).  The 
first scenario examined was a head-on encounter with the encounter parameters in Figure 3. 
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Minimum Maneuver Distance - Horizontal 
Head-on Encounter, 30 deg Turn 
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Figure 3:  Minimum Maneuver Distance - Head-On 
 
Table 1 uses the required maneuver distance for a UA flying at 200 kts and applies a range of 
detection processing times to show how the required distance varies with intruder velocity for a 
500 ft required miss distance. 
Intruder Velocity 10 20 30 40
200 kts 13,426 21,856 30,286 38,716
250 kts 14,126 22,556 30,986 39,416
300 kts 14,675 23,105 31,535 39,965
350 kts 15,299 23,729 32,159 40,589
400 kts 16,025 24,455 32,885 41,315
Detection Processing (sec)
Required Detection Range (ft)
 
Table 1:  Required Detection Range – Horizontal Maneuver 
 
Figure 4 shows how the Minimum Maneuver Distance varies with changes in the UA and 
intruder aircraft velocities.   
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Figure 4:  Minimum Horizontal Maneuver Distance - Velocity Impact 
The previous data are all based on a head-on encounter.  The effect of encounter geometry is 
examined in Figure 5 by utilizing the same UA input conditions as in Figure 3, but with an 
intruder aircraft closing from 60o off the nose of the UA. 
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60 deg Off-Nose Encounter, 30 deg Turn 
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Figure 5:  Minimum Maneuver Distance - 60 degrees Off Nose 
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Finally, Figure 6 shows the Minimum Maneuver Distance data from Figure 3 plotted in terms of 
the time to impact. 
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Figure 6:  Minimum Maneuver Time - Head-On 
 
C.5.2 Vertical Maneuver 
Vertical avoidance maneuvers must also be examined in addition to horizontal.  Figure 7 depicts 
the maneuver and input parameters.  As with horizontal maneuver scenarios, the intruder aircraft 
is assumed to be non-maneuvering.  Unlike the horizontal maneuver, however, there is no turn 
radius associated with the change in vertical velocity.  The change is assumed to be 
instantaneous at the beginning of the avoidance maneuver. 
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ROA Climb/Dive Rate
ROA Climb/Dive Rate
ROA Altitude Change  
Figure 7:  Vertical Avoidance Maneuver 
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For an intruder aircraft at the same altitude as the UA, results are shown in Figure 8 for a series 
of UA vertical velocities and required miss distances.  In addition to the assumption that the UA 
instantaneously assumes the desired climb/dive rate when the maneuver is initiated, both aircraft 
maintain a constant velocity throughout the scenario.   
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Figure 8:  Required Maneuver Distance – Vertical 
 
Table 2 results from applying the same detection processing times used in the horizontal 
maneuver analysis to a vertical avoidance scenario with the UA at 200 kts, intruder aircraft at 
300 kts and a 200 ft/min vertical velocity to achieve a 100 ft miss distance. 
 
Intruder Velocity 10 20 30 40
200 kts 27,004 33,756 40,507 47,258
250 kts 30,380 37,975 45,570 53,165
300 kts 33,756 42,194 50,633 59,072
350 kts 37,131 46,414 55,697 64,979
400 kts 40,507 50,633 60,760 70,887
Required Detection Range (ft)
Detection Processing (sec)
 
Table 2:  Required Detection Range – Vertical 
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Figure 9 shows how the required maneuver distance increases with higher closing velocities for a 
relatively low vertical velocity.  In this case, it takes 150 seconds for the UA to change altitude 
by 500 ft with a 200 ft/min vertical velocity.  If both aircraft are flying at 200 kts (337 ft/sec), the 
distance traveled by both aircraft is over 16 nm.   
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Figure 9:  Minimum Maneuver Distance – Velocity Impact 
